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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
PlaintifffAppellee,

:
:

v.

:

JOSEPH P. TUNZI,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 20000728-CA
Priority No. 2

:

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The jurisdictional nature of the Serious Youth Offender ("S.Y.O.") Act is apparent
from the language of the statute, its location in the Juvenile Courts Act, the surrounding
direct file and certification statutes, and Utah case law. Because Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-3a-602(10) creates a jurisdictional rule that mandates that the juvenile court regain
jurisdiction, Appellant's claim that the case should have been remanded to the juvenile
court was not waived when he pled guilty to third degree felony aggravated assault.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-602(10), which requires that the juvenile court regain
jurisdiction when the "charges'1 are dismissed or result in acquittal, required remand to the
juvenile court in this case when Appellant/Defendant Joseph Tunzi ("Appellant" or
"Joseph") was acquitted of the charge of attempted homicide. The term "charges" refers
to charges for serious youth offenses which originate in juvenile court and which provide
the basis for bindover to district court. In this case, attempted homicide was the only

charge which originated in juvenile court and on which Appellant was bound over to
district court. Subsection (10) therefore required that the juvenile court regain
jurisdiction when the jury signed the verdict form acquitting Joseph of that charge.
Nothing in the Act suggests that the relevant charges include lesser offenses for
which the state requests instructions at trial. Case law from other jurisdictions
interpreting direct file statutes that do not contain language similar to that of subsection
(10) provide no guidance. Moreover, some courts have concluded that even in the
absence of language similar to that of subsection (10), the juvenile court regains
jurisdiction when the juvenile is acquitted of the charge which provided the basis for adult
court jurisdiction. The state's argument taken to its conclusion would result in remand to
the juvenile court only when all charges bound over pursuant to subsection (7) and the
lessers for those charges were dismissed or resulted in acquittal; in other words, only
when no charges or convictions existed. This would render the language of subsection
(10) meaningless. The language of subsections (7) and (10) of the S.Y.O. Act and a
comparison of that language with the language of the direct file and certification statutes
establish that the district court loses jurisdiction when the juvenile is convicted of a lesser
offense and acquitted of the offense which provided the basis for the bindover.
This Court need not reach the state's argument that the "charges" in subsection
(10) include all lesser offenses because in this case, the aggravated assault lessers were
not necessarily included in the charge of attempted homicide. Both versions of
2

aggravated assault contain additional elements which are not contained in attempted
homicide. The juvenile judge therefore did not find those elements when he bound
Joseph over on the charge of attempted homicide. The requirement of subsection (7) that
the juvenile court judge find probable cause to support a bindover in order to send
charges to district court was not met. Since the aggravated assault lessers did not comply
with the S.Y.O. procedure, they are not relevant "charges" under subsection (10).
The state makes an alternative argument that even if the S.Y.O. Act requires
remand to juvenile court when the juvenile is acquitted of all offenses which require
S.Y.O. treatment, this case did not require remand because Joseph was not acquitted of
second degree felony aggravated assault, an offense which qualifies for such treatment.
This argument fails not only because the second degree felony was not charged or bound
over in compliance with the S.Y.O. procedure, but also because (1) the second degree
felony was dismissed and subsection (10) requires remand in the event of a dismissal or
acquittal, and (2) the protection against Double Jeopardy precludes further prosecution on
the second degree felony.
ARGUMENT
POINT I. JOSEPH DID NOT WAIVE HIS JURISDICTIONAL
ARGUMENT.
A review of the language of the S.Y.O Act, the certification and direct file
statutes, and In re E.G.T., 808 P.2d 138 (Utah App. 1991), the only case on which the

3

state relies, demonstrates that Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-601(10) is jurisdictional and
therefore was not waived when Joseph pled guilty to the third degree felony. Chapter 3a
of Title 78 is "known as the ' Juvenile Court Act of 1996.'" Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-101
(1996). Part 6 of that chapter, where the S.Y.O. Act is found, titled "Transfer of
Jurisdiction", outlines circumstances where jurisdiction is transferred from juvenile to
district court. Part 6 contains the direct file, certification and S.Y.O. Act, all of which
address circumstances under which a district court can exercise jurisdiction over a
juvenile. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-3a-601, 602, 603 (1996). Since all three statutes in
part 6 of section 78-3a limit district court jurisdiction over a juvenile, it is apparent that
the S.Y.O. Act, direct file and certification statutes are jurisdictional in nature.
Section 78-3a-602 outlines the limits on district court jurisdiction over a juvenile
sixteen or older who is charged by Information with one of the nine S.Y.O. offenses.
Pursuant to section 78-3a-602(3)(d) and (4), the district court never obtains jurisdiction
over a juvenile charged with a serious youth offender offense if all of the conditions of
subsection (3) are satisfied; under such circumstances, the juvenile court has jurisdiction
and "proceed[s] upon the information as though it were a juvenile petition." Utah Code
Ann. § 78-3a-602(3)(d); (4). Additionally, even if jurisdiction is transferred to the district
court, the S.Y.O. Act expressly provides that the juvenile court regains jurisdiction when
there is an acquittal or dismissal. Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-602(10). The reference in
subsection (10) to section 78-3a-104 (1996) further emphasizes that this requirement is
4

jurisdictional since section 78-3a-104 outlines the "Jurisdiction of the Juvenile CourtOriginal-Exclusive." Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-104. The language of sections 78-3a-602
and 78-3a-104 leaves no doubt that subsection (10) creates a jurisdictional requirement.
Utah decisions also demonstrate that the statutes in Part 6 of Chapter 3 a of Title 78
articulate the parameters of district court jurisdiction over juveniles charged with crimes.
For example, State v. MohL 901 P.2d 991, 995-98 (Utah 1995) refers to juvenile and
district court jurisdiction in the context of its discussion regarding the constitutionality of
the direct file statute. Id at 997, 998. In re A.B.. 936 P.2d 1091, 1094-1099 (Utah App.
1997) likewise uses the term "jurisdiction" when discussing the direct file statute (id. at
1094), and indicates that the S.Y.O. Act creates district court jurisdiction when the
requirements of the statute are met. Id. at 1095. In addition to the plain language of
section 78-3a-602 and the other statutes in Part 6, Mohi and In re A.B. further
demonstrate that the S.Y.O. Act creates jurisdictional limits; therefore, the jurisdictional
requirements of section 78-3a-602(10) cannot be waived. See Appellant's brief at 6-8.
The state ignores the plain language of the relevant statutes as well as Mohi and In
re A.B. and instead argues that "had defendant been certified from juvenile court pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-603 (Supp. 2000) on a charge of second or even third degree
felony aggravated assault, the district court would have acquired subject matter
jurisdiction over the defendant." S.B. at 7. This argument is irrelevant because Joseph
was not certified; the issue before this Court involves interpretation of the S.Y.O. Act,
5

and speculation as to whether Joseph could have been certified has no bearing on that
issue and does not create district court jurisdiction.1
As its only support for the novel argument that the jurisdictional language of the
Act does not define the limits on district court jurisdiction, the state relies on In re
E.G.T.. 808 P.2d 138 (Utah App. 1991). S.B. at 8. In In re E.G.T.. the minor appealed
from the juvenile court certification order, claiming that he had been denied his Sixth
Amendment right to counsel at the certification proceedings. Id. at 140. While the appeal
was pending, the case proceeded to district court, where the juvenile pled guilty. Id. at
138-39. Reiving on In re Gault 387 U.S. l,41,87S.Ct. 1428, 1451, 18L.Ed.2d527
1

Without any support, the state suggests in footnote 1 to its brief at 7 that "if
defendant succeeds in returning to juvenile court, he will likely be certified back to
district court to stand trial on the charge of second degree felony aggravated assault."
This Court should not consider this assertion because the state failed to adequately brief
it, in violation of Utah R. App. P. 24. More importantly, the state's assertion is incorrect
and not supported by the record. First, because judgment was originally entered against
Joseph for a third degree felony, res judicata and the protection against double jeopardy
preclude the state from proceeding on a second degree felony after the case was reversed
on appeal. See discussion infra at 21-25. Additionally, certification is not a pro forma
proceeding which culminates in district court jurisdiction over a juvenile at the snap of
the state's fingers. Instead, the state has the burden of establishing "by a preponderance
of the evidence, that it would be contrary to the best interests of the minor or the public
for the juvenile court to retain jurisdiction." Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-603(2)(b). Because
a certification hearing has not been held, the ten factors which "the juvenile court shall
consider, and may base its [certification] decision on" (Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-603(3))
are not part of this record and have not been considered by the juvenile court. In this case
where the record does not demonstrate any of the factors or that such factors support
certification, and the state is precluded from proceeding on the second degree felony, the
state's claim in footnote 1 that Joseph will be certified to district court on a second degree
felony charge is irrelevant, unsupported and incorrect.

6

(1967), this Court held that the right to counsel "is waivable, and, therefore,
nonjurisdictional." In re E.G.T., 808 P.2d at 140. Even a superficial reading shows that
E.G.T. waived only his claim that his right to counsel was violated at the certification
proceedings and therefore does not address the issue in this case.
The present case is distinguishable from In re E.G.T. because the issue is not
whether a procedure at the juvenile court preliminary hearing Joseph's rights. Instead,
the issue is whether the limitations on district court jurisdiction, as mandated by section
78-3a-602(10), were violated when the trial court did not remand the case to the juvenile
court after the initial conviction for a third degree felony. Because this issue directly
addresses the jurisdiction of the district court to proceed with sentencing and entry of
judgment, it is jurisdictional in nature and was not waived by Joseph's guilty plea.
POINT II. THE JUVENILE COURT REGAINED JURISDICTION
AFTER THE JURY ACQUITTED JOSEPH OF ATTEMPTED
HOMICIDE.
The state's argument that the juvenile court did not regain jurisdiction when
Joseph was acquitted of attempted homicide because Joseph was implicitly bound over
on, and never acquitted of, the aggravated assault charges (S.B. at 9-17) fails because (1)
attempted homicide is the relevant "charge'1 under subsection (10) and the jury acquitted
Joseph of that "charge",2 and (2) even if this Court were to consider the state's argument
2

A rule of statutory construction found in Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-12(l)(a) (2000)
requires that plural and singular forms of a word are substituted for each other. Id. ("The
singular number include the plural, and the plural the singular.")
7

that lesser offenses are "charges" within the meaning of subsection (10), Joseph was not
implicitly bound over on the aggravated assault lessers because both versions of
aggravated assault contained elements which are not included in attempted homicide.
The state's alternative argument that second degree felony aggravated assault is a serious
youth offender offense over which the district court has jurisdiction fails because that
charge was dismissed, requiring remand to juvenile court and also because the Double
Jeopardy precludes the state from prosecuting the second degree felony after Joseph's
conviction for the third degree felony was reversed on appeal.
A. The Juvenile Court Regained Jurisdiction Pursuant to Subsection (10)
When the Jury Acquitted Joseph of Attempted Homicide, or Assuming.
Arguendo, Joseph Was Bound Over on the Lessers, at the Time the Second
Degree Felony Aggravated Assault Was Dismissed.
1. The Jury Acquitted Joseph of Attempted Homicide, the Only Serious
Youth Offender Offense on Which He Was Bound Over to District Court
and the Only "Charge" in this Case.
There is no question that the jury acquitted Joseph of attempted homicide, the only
charge filed against him in juvenile court. R. 109; see Addendum to this brief containing
signed verdict form acquitting Joseph of attempted homicide. Since Joseph was acquitted
of the only "charge" in juvenile court which provided a basis for bindover to district
court, section 78-3a-602( 10) required that the juvenile court regain jurisdiction.
The term "charges" in subsection (10) refers to charges which originate in juvenile
court and on which the defendant is bound over. Statutes found in Chapter 3 a of Title 78

8

,f

are not part of the criminal code, but are part of the Juvenile Courts Act;" they "were

promulgated with juvenile procedures and issues in mind and were meant to apply to the
juvenile context." State v. Harrison. 2001 UT 33,1fl7,

P.2d

. The "charges" in

subsection (10) are therefore charges which arise in juvenile court and provide the basis
for the bindover to district court, and not lesser offense instructions given at trial.
The only "charge" filed in juvenile or district court prior to verdict was attempted
homicide, the charge outlined in the Information. Although the state requested lesser
offense instructions at trial, it did not file an Information charging aggravated assault
prior to trial. R. 9-10.3 The state's request at trial that a lesser instruction be given does
not turn those lesser offenses into subsection (10)"charges". In this case, the only charge
to which subsection (10) could refer is attempted homicide.
Relying on Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-602(7), the state argues that the "charges"
which should be considered under subsection (10) are not limited to the charges which
created district court jurisdiction and on which the juvenile was bound over, but instead
include any lesser included offenses of the charges which created district court
jurisdiction. S.B. at 10-14. Subsection (7) states:

3

On remand following the appeal, the state asked to proceed on the original
Information which charged Joseph with attempted homicide. R. 171-76. While the trial
court later orally amended the Information when Joseph pled guilty to third degree
aggravated assault on remand following appeal, this amendment as part of the plea
proceeding occurred well after the case should have been remanded to the juvenile court
and therefore could not be a "charge" to be considered under subsection (10).
9

When a defendant is charged with multiple criminal offenses in the same
information or indictment and is bound over to answer in the district court
for one or more charges under this section, other offenses arising from the
same criminal episode and any subsequent misdemeanors or felonies
charged against him shall be considered together with those charges, and
where the court finds probable cause to believe that those crimes have been
committed and that the defendant committed them, the defendant shall also
be bound over to the district court to answer for those charges.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-602(7).
The state's interpretation that the term "charges" in subsection (10) also refers to
any other uncharged lesser offenses ignores the language and purpose of the S.Y.O. Act.
While subsection (7) allows bindover of other charges from the same criminal episode as
well as subsequent charges after a juvenile is bound over on a serious youth offender
offense, subsection (7) requires the juvenile judge to find probable cause prior to any such
bindover. A juvenile judge does not make an explicit finding of probable cause regarding
lessers; moreover, in this case where the aggravated assault lesser contained elements
which are not elements of attempted homicide, the juvenile court judge did not implicitly
make such findings. See discussion infra at 15-18. Because the aggravated assault
lessers were not offenses that were either explicitly or implicitly bound over by the
juvenile judge, they are not relevant charges under subsection (10).
The state's argument also ignores the fact that in the certification statute, the
Legislature expressly provided that the juvenile could be convicted in district court of the
offense charged or any offense arising out of the same criminal episode. Utah Code Ann.

10

§ 78-3a-603(13). The S.Y.O. statute does not contain similar language allowing the case
to remain in district court on a a conviction for other offenses from the same criminal
episode. Instead, the S.Y.O. statute allows other offenses to be tacked on when a case is
sent to district court, but mandates that the case be returned to juvenile court if the
juvenile is acquitted of the charges which provided the basis for the bindover.
The state's interpretation of the term "charges" in subsection (10) to include lesser
offenses based on the language of subsection (7) would render the requirement of
subsection (10) meaningless. While the state argues in this case only that lesser included
offenses are included in the meaning of the term "charges," its analysis based on
subsection (7) would apply equally to other charges tacked on pursuant to subsection (7)
following a bindover for a serious youth offender offense.4 Taken to its logical end,
pursuant to the state's interpretation, subsection (10) would require remand to the juvenile
court in only the rarest of cases where all of the S.Y.O. offenses, all offenses tacked on
under subsection (7), and all lesser offenses are dismissed or result in acquittal.
The focus in subsection (7) as well as the focus in the rest of the S.Y.O. Act, is on
the serious offense which qualifies the case for district court jurisdiction. The fact that
4

Consider, for example, a juvenile who is bound over on a S.Y.O. charge of
aggravated robbery. If the juvenile is subsequently charged with possession of tobacco, a
class C misdemeanor, that misdemeanor will also be transferred to district court pursuant
to subsection (7). After the case is in district court, if the aggravated robbery is dismissed
because the witnesses identify someone else who confesses, the class C misdemeanor
would nevertheless remain in district court under the state's interpretation. Such an
approach does not further the purposes of the S.Y.O. Act.
11

subsection (7) allows the efficient prosecution of a juvenile who has been bound over on
a serious youth offender offense by tacking on other offenses, does not change that focus.
The purpose of the S.Y.O. Act, which is aimed at transferring jurisdiction over juveniles
who commit serious violent felonies, is met by remanding cases to juvenile court when
the juvenile is not convicted of the offense which provided the basis for the transfer.
Conversely, the purpose of the statute is not furthered when the district court retains
jurisdiction over a case after the juvenile is acquitted of the serious youth offender
offenses or those offenses are dismissed.
The state attempts to bolster its argument that this case should not be remanded by
arguing that several jurisdictions allow the district court to retain jurisdiction when a
juvenile is convicted of a lesser charge that would not have been a basis for adult court
jurisdiction. S.B. at 11-12. The state's cases are, however, inapposite since they for the
most part involve direct file statutes which do not contain a provision for remand if the
juvenile is acquitted of the charges or the charges are dismissed. See cases cited in S.B.
at 11-13. Since section 78-3a-602(10) controls this issue, the state's cases from other
jurisdictions interpreting other statutes provide no guidance.
Moreover, some courts have concluded that a case should be remanded to the
juvenile court when the juvenile is convicted of a lesser charge which would not have
supported district court jurisdiction, even when there is no statutory language requiring
such a remand. See e ^ Metcalf v. Commonwealth, 156 N.E.2d 648, 652-53 (Mass.
12

1959); State v. Torres, 538 A.2d 185, 192 (Conn. 1988); State v. Bedford, 190 So. 347,
351 (La. 1939). The rationale for remanding the case to juvenile court when the juvenile
is acquitted of the charge which provided the basis for the transfer but convicted of a
lesser is that such an approach is consistent with the policies underlying the juvenile
system. Torres, 538 A.2d at 192. Remanding a serious youth offender case to juvenile
court when the juvenile is acquitted of the charge which caused the case to be transferred
to adult court is likewise consistent with the policies underlying Utah's juvenile court
system as well as the policies underlying the S.Y.O. Act.
The state also attempts to bolster its position by arguing that the district court
should retain jurisdiction over a lesser offense which does not otherwise sustain
jurisdiction because otherwise trial courts could not instruct juries and could not accept
guilty pleas on lesser offenses. S.B. at 13, citing State v. Morales, 694 A.2d 758, 762
(Conn. 1997). This argument fails because (1) it incorrectly assumes that lack of
jurisdiction to sentence a juvenile or enter judgment on certain charges means that a trial
court cannot instruct the jury or accept pleas on lesser offenses; and (2) due process
requires a lesser included instruction only when requested by the defendant under certain
circumstances; in this case where the state requested an instruction on lesser charges
which are not necessarily included in the charged offense, due process is not implicated.
First, although section 78-3a-602(10) specifies that the juvenile court regains
jurisdiction if the juvenile is acquitted of the charges, it does not preclude the district
13

court from giving an instruction on a lesser charge where appropriate. Indeed,
subsection (10) requires remand to the juvenile court only after acquittal or dismissal of
the charges; subsection (10) does not say that the trial court does not have the authority to
submit a lesser included offense instruction to the jury or to accept a guilty plea to a lesser
charge, each of which would occur prior to any acquittal or dismissal. This means that
the district court has jurisdiction to conduct the trial pursuant to due process and statutory
requirements, and the case is remanded to the juvenile court only if the juvenile is
acquitted of the charges on which he was bound over or those charges are dismissed.
Second, although nothing in the statute precludes a judge from instructing a jury
on lesser offenses which are otherwise appropriate, even if the statute did preclude such
instructions, due process was not implicated in this case where the state requested an
instruction on lesser offenses which were not necessarily included in the original charge.
The due process concerns outlined in Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980) and State v.
Oldrovd, 685 P.2d 551, 555 (Utah 1984), on which the state relies at page 13 of its brief,
arise when a defendant requests an instruction on a lesser included offense, and the
evidence "would permit a jury to find a defendant guilty of the lesser offense and not
guilty of the greater

" Oldrovd, 685 P.2d at 555. The state therefore incorrectly

relies on Oldroyd and Beck in support of its claim that precluding a judge from
instructing a jury on a lesser would raise constitutional concerns in this case where the
state requested the lesser included instruction, and the elements of the lesser offenses
14

were not necessarily included in the charge of attempted homicide. By following the
language of the statute and remanding a case to the juvenile court after acquittal, this
Court would not also be adopting a rule that the district court cannot instruct on a lesser
included offense or accept a lesser plea; such instruction or acceptance would occur prior
to any acquittal or dismissal of the "charges11 and would not affect the district court
jurisdiction over the S.Y.O. case.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-602(10) required that the case be remanded to the
juvenile court when the jury acquitted Joseph of attempted homicide, the serious youth
offender offense on which he was bound over to district court. In this case where Joseph
was not charged with aggravated assault and was not bound over to district court on that
charge, aggravated assault is not a relevant "charge" for purposes of subsection (10).
Since the jury acquitted Joseph of the only relevant "charge" under subsection (10), Utah
Code Ann. § 78-3a-602(10) mandated that the juvenile court regain jurisdiction.
2. The Elements of Aggravated Assault Are Not Necessarily Included in the
Elements Found by the Juvenile Judge to Bind Joseph Over on Attempted
Homicide.
The state argues that subsection (7) of Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-602 (1996) allows
the district court to retain jurisdiction over a serious youth offender case when a
defendant is acquitted of the S.Y.O. offense which provided the basis for the bindover but
convicted of a lesser included offense. S.B. at 10-14. According to the state, the district
court has jurisdiction over the serious youth offender charge as well as any lesser
15

included offenses after a bindover from juvenile court because the juvenile court's finding
of probable cause on the serious youth offender charge "' necessarily would include
probable cause that the defendant also committed the lesser included offenses

'" S.B.

at 10, citing Commonwealth v. Williams, 691 N.E.2d 553, 556 (Mass. 1998). Pursuant to
the state's argument, the requirement of subsection (7) that the juvenile court find
probable cause to bind the juvenile over on any charges arising out of the same criminal
episode or any subsequent charges which are bound over to district court is met with
regard to lesser offenses because although the juvenile judge does not make an explicit
finding of probable cause, such finding is implicit in the bindover on the greater charge.
This Court need not decide in this case whether a lesser included offense is a
charge on which a defendant is implicitly bound over under the S.Y.O.Act5 because the
aggravated assault charges are not necessarily included in the attempted murder charge;
the juvenile court judge's finding of probable cause to bind Joseph over on attempted
homicide did not therefore include a finding of probable cause to bind Joseph over on
aggravated assault charges. A comparison of the elements of attempted homicide with
5

Assuming Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-602(7) requires an explicit finding by the
juvenile court judge as to each charge on which the juvenile is bound over to district
court, the state's argument that a juvenile is implicitly bound over on all lesser included
charges fails. This Court need not reach this issue in this case, however, because (1) the
aggravated assault elements were not necessarily included in attempted homicide and the
juvenile judge therefore did not necessarily bind Joseph over on those charges, and (2)
even if the juvenile court judge had bound Joseph over on the second degree felony
aggravated assault, that charge was, at the very least, dismissed and the case must
therefore be remanded to juvenile court.
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the elements for the two forms of aggravated assault establishes that aggravated assault is
not necessarily included in attempted homicide. See generally State v. Finlayson. 2000
UT 10,If 16, 994 P.2d 1243 (statutory elements of a crime control whether a crime is
lesser included offense). The elements of attempted murder, the S.Y.O. offense on which
Joseph was bound over, are an attempt to knowingly or intentionally cause the death of
another. R. 95; Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-201 (1999). The elements for the two versions of
aggravated assault submitted to the jury were a knowing or intentional assault which
intentionally caused serious bodily injury or was accomplished by the use of a dangerous
weapon or other means of force likely to cause death or serious bodily injury. R. 96;
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1999). Because an attempt to commit a homicide does not
require causing serious bodily injury or using a dangerous weapon or the requisite force,
the aggravated assault charges contain elements which are not necessarily included in the
charge of attempted murder.6 The juvenile court judge's bindover on attempted murder
6

The state requested the lesser included instruction on aggravated assault in this
case. R. 73. Because a transcript of the second day of trial does not exist, any discussion
regarding the instructions is not recorded. Nevertheless, it was improper to give the
instruction on the lesser offenses requested by the state because the elements were not
"necessarily included'1 in the offense charged. See State v.Carruth. 1999 UT 107, ffl[5-18,
993 P.2d 869 (elements of lesser charge requested by the state must be completely
contained in charged offense); State v. Piansiaksone. 954 P.2d 861, 869 (Utah 1998)
(same); State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152, 155 (Utah 1983) (same). In the context of a serious
youth offender case, where the basis for transferring jurisdiction to district court is the
serious youth offender charge, allowing the state leeway in requesting instructions on
lesser charges after the case is transferred to district court undercuts the purposes of the
S.Y.O. Act in that it allows the state to overcharge a case in juvenile court in order to
transfer it to adult court, then proceed in adult court on the lesser charge which the
17

therefore did not necessarily include a finding of probable cause to believe Joseph used a
weapon and caused serious bodily injury.7
Even if this Court were to entertain the state's argument that the "charges" in
subsection (10) include offenses on which a juvenile was implicitly bound over, Joseph
was not implicitly bound over on the aggravated assault offenses because those offenses
involve additional elements which were not found by the juvenile court judge as part of
the attempted homicide bindover. Because the juvenile court judge did not find those
additional elements, Joseph was not bound over on the aggravated assault offense as
required by subsection (7), and the aggravated assault offenses do not qualify as
"charges" under subsection (10).8

evidence actually supports. To the extent this Court embraces the state's argument and
precludes remand when a juvenile is convicted of a lesser in adult court, prosecutors
would be encouraged to overcharge their cases in order to establish an easy route to adult
court in cases which do not otherwise qualify for adult court treatment.
7

The juvenile court's findings would have to include probable cause for the
elements of both forms of aggravated assault since both versions were presented to the
jury.
8

For a bindover under the S.Y.O. Act, the juvenile court finds not only probable
cause to believe the crime was committed by the defendant, but also that the three
retention factors are not met. In cases where the juvenile is bound over on a greater
offense and that offense is dismissed in adult court, reliance on an implicit finding by the
juvenile court that the juvenile also committed the lesser included offense does not satisfy
the requirement that the juvenile judge also find that the three retention factors have not
been met. Analysis of the retention factors, particularly those which consider the minor's
role and culpability, may be different if only a lesser is considered. Accordingly, the
S.Y.O. contemplates an explicit bindover finding in order to send any charge, even a
lesser included offense, to district court.
18

B. The State's Alternative Argument Fails Because the Second Degree
Felony Aggravated Assault Charge Was Dismissed and Subsection (10)
Requires Remand When the Relevant Charge Is Dismissed; Moreover,
Double Jeopardy Precludes the State from Proceeding on the Second
Degree Felony.
The state makes an alternative argument that even if "a district court loses
jurisdiction over a serious youth offender who is acquitted of all charges that would have
supported the original bindover to district court, defendant loses this appeal because he
was never acquitted of second degree felony aggravated assault, a lesser included offense
and an enumerated serious youth offense capable of supporting bindover.'1 S.B. at 14.
This argument fails not only because Joseph was not implicitly bound over on the second
degree felony, but also because (1) regardless of whether Joseph was acquitted of the
second degree felony, it was dismissed and subsection (10) requires remand to the
juvenile court if the relevant charge is dismissed, and (2) the protection against Double
Jeopardy precludes the state from proceeding on the second degree felony, thereby
effectively dismissing or acquitting Joseph of that charge.
1. Even If this Court Were to Look Beyond the Charges filed in Juvenile
Court, the Second Degree Felony Version of Aggravated Assault Was
Dismissed; Since Subsection (10) Requires that the Juvenile Court Regain
Jurisdiction If the Defendant Is Acquitted of the Charges or the Charges
Are Dismissed, the Case Should Have Been Remanded to the Juvenile
Court.
Despite the clear acquittal on attempted homicide, the only "charge" against
Joseph, the state argues that the requirement of subsection (10) that the juvenile court
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not require remand to the juvenile court in this case because there is an ambiguity as to
whether the jury convicted Joseph of second or third degree felony aggravated assault.
S.B. at 114-18. In other words, according to the state, since we cannot be absolutely
certain the jury did not convict Joseph of the second degree felony version of aggravated
assault, Joseph was not acquitted of this S.Y.O. offense and the case must remain in adult
court because Joseph has not been acquitted of all S.Y.O. offender offenses. Id. Even if
this Court were to consider the lesser offense instructions as one of the "charges'1 under
subsection (10), the state's claim that remand is not required because Joseph was not
acquitted of the relevant charges is easily rejected since subsection (10) also requires that
the juvenile court regain jurisdiction if the charges are dismissed. While the state goes to
great lengths to argue that Joseph was not acquitted of second degree felony aggravated
assault, it ignores the fact that regardless of whether Joseph was acquitted of second
degree felony aggravated assault, that charge was dismissed following the trial pursuant
to the state's own stipulation. R. 222:3-4. Since subsection (10) requires that the juvenile
court regain jurisdiction when there is an acquittal or a dismissal, the entry of the third
degree felony following the original trial constituted a dismissal of the second degree
felony charge, thereby mandating that the case be remanded to the juvenile court.
In this case, where pursuant to the stipulation of the state, the trial judge entered
conviction for the third degree felony, the second degree felony version of aggravated
assault was dismissed following the trial. Therefore, Joseph was convicted of a
20

non-serious youth offender offense and pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-602 (10) the
juvenile court regained jurisdiction.
2. Regardless of Whether the Jury Acquitted Joseph of the Second Degree
Felony Version of Aggravated Assault, the Protection Against Double
Jeopardy and Due Process Preclude Further Prosecution on the Second
Degree Felony Aggravated Assault
While the dismissal of the second degree felony easily does away with the state's
alternative argument, the fact the state is precluded from reprosecuting Joseph on the
second degree felony emphasizes that the case should have been remanded to the juvenile
court. The Fifth Amendment protection against Double Jeopardy involves two
protections; it bars reprosecution of a charge (1) where there is an acquittal, or (2) when
the parties have litigated an issue and a final judgment of dismissal on the merits has been
entered. State v. Bvrns. 911 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah App. 1995) (citing Ashe v. Swenson.
397 U.S. 436, 443-46, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 1195-95, 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970): United States v.
BlackwelL 900 F.2d 742, 745 (4th Cir. 1990)). Both aspects of the protection bar the state
from reprosecuting Joseph on the second degree felony.
First, regardless of whether the jury acquitted Joseph of second degree felony
aggravated assault, the state is barred from prosecuting Joseph on that charge based on
the doctrine of res judicata as incorporated in the Fifth Amendment protection against
Double Jeopardy. See United States v. Oppenheimer. 242 U.S. 85 (1916) (finality of
previous adjudication bars reprosecution under Double Jeopardy protection). In
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Oppenheimer, the Court held that a prior adjudication based on a statute of limitations bar
precluded the government from later prosecuting that charge even though the prior
adjudication was subsequently held to be incorrect in another case. Oppenheimer, 242
U.S. at 87. Since the charge against Oppenheimer had been dismissed on the merits and
final judgment entered, the subsequent ruling in another case that the statute of limitations
did not bar the action had no impact on the finality of the judgment in Oppenheimer's
case. In fact, the doctrine of res judicata, incorporated in the protection against Double
Jeopardy, precluded the government from refiling the previously dismissed charge. IcL at
86-88. The Court reasoned that "a judgment for the defendant upon the ground that the
prosecution is barred goes to his liability as a matter of substantive law, and one judgment
that he is free as a matter of substantive law is as good as another." Id. at 87; see also
Ashe, 397 U.S. at 445-46 (doctrine of collateral estoppel "is embodied in the Fifth
Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy"); Byms, 911 P.2d at 984 (Double
Jeopardy "protects criminal defendants from having to relitigate issues that have been
resolved in their favor by a valid and final judgment"); United States v. Blackwell, 900
F.2d 742, 745 (4th Cir. 1990) (Double Jeopardy precludes successive prosecutions for the
same offense as well as relitigation of issues which were "conclusively litigated and
necessarily determined" as part of a previously entered judgment).
The doctrine of res judicata, as embodied in the protection against Double
Jeopardy, precludes the state from reprosecuting Joseph on the second degree felony
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Jeopardy, precludes the state from reprosecuting Joseph on the second degree felony
aggravated assault and further demonstrates that the case should have been remanded to
the juvenile court when the trial judge initially entered a conviction for the third degree
felony. After the jury acquitted Joseph of attempted homicide but convicted him of
aggravated assault, the state stipulated that because it could not be ascertained which
version of aggravated assault the jury found, Joseph must be convicted for the third
degree felony version. R. 222:3-4. After the state made this concession and the judge
entered judgment of conviction for a third degree felony, the state did not appeal the entry
of the third degree felony. That judgment is therefore final. See D'Aston v. D'Aston,
844 P.2d 345, 350 (Utah App. 1992) (doctrine of res judicata bars relitigation of a claim
where both actions involve the same parties, the claim was presented and fully litigated,
and final judgment on the merits was issued). The state's claim for the first time in this
appeal that the district court has continuing jurisdiction over the case because the jury did
not acquit Joseph of the second degree felony is contrary to the protection against Double
Jeopardy since any attempt to reprosecute Joseph on the second degree felony would
violate that protection.
The protection against Double Jeopardy also bars the state from prosecuting
Joseph on the second degree felony under the implied acquittal rule of Green v. United
States. 355 U.S. 184, 190-91 (1957) and Price v. Georgia. 398 U.S. 323, 329 (1970).
Although the state argues that the implied acquittal rule does not apply because the
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an acquittal on the second degree felony aggravated assault be implied. See Livingston v.
Murdaush. 183 F.3d 300, 301 (4th Cir. 1999).
In Livingston, the jury was incorrectly instructed that it would convict the
defendant of either felony, driving under the influence or reckless homicide. The jury
convicted the defendant of felony DUI and the prosecutor marked "judicial dismissal" on
the reckless homicide indictment. Id at 301. Although the erroneous instruction resulted
in uncertainty as to whether the jury acquitted Livingston of the reckless homicide,
relying on Green and Price, the Court held that under the unusual circumstances of the
case, an acquittal must be implied. Id. at 301-02. The court reasoned that this was
particularly true in light of the dismissal of the reckless homicide charge.
The facts in Livingston are substantially similar to those in the present case.
Because the elements for both the second and third degree felony versions of aggravated
assault were presented to the jury in a single Information, the jury could essentially
convict Joseph of only one version of aggravated assault. The jury's verdict did not
explicitly acquit Joseph of the second degree felony; it also did not, however, convict
him. Under such circumstances, acquittal of the second degree felony must be implied.9
9

The state relies on Potts v. State, 369 S.E.2d 746 (Ga. 1988) for the proposition
that the implied acquittal rule of Green/Price does not apply unless there is an
unambiguous acquittal of the greater charge. S.B. at 15. Price v. Georgia and Green v.
United States do not create the rigid requirement outlined by the state. Instead, the focus
is on the impropriety, unfairness and chilling effect on the right to appeal which would
occur if the government were allowed to prosecute a defendant who has successfully
appealed his convicted by going forward on a greater charge than that from which he
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In this case where the protection against Double Jeopardy precluded the state from
reprosecuting Joseph on second degree felony aggravated assault, the state's argument
that the district court had continuing jurisdiction over the second degree felony fails.
CONCLUSION
Defendant/Appellant Joseph Tunzi respectfully requests that this Court order that
his adult court conviction be stricken and the case remanded to juvenile court.

(jk*Cu)^
JOAN C. WATT
JOHN O'CONNELL, JR.
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant

appealed. Moreover, regardless of how the Georgia Supreme Court interprets the implied
acquittal rule, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-405(1) (1999) precludes the state from prosecuting
on a greater charge after a conviction has been set aside on appeal.
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ADDENDUM

In the District Court of the Tliird Judicial District
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah

THE STATE OF UTAH.

Plaintiff
vs.

VERDICT

JOSEPH P. TUNZK
Caae No.

981926150

Defendant
We, the Jurors impaneled in the above case, find
. Joseph.. P.....Tunz±,

th.e...de.f.endant,.

Mt...G.ulLtx.M..MJ;.en[ipt.ed...Cr.iminal..HQ[ai.c.i.d£*...as...ch.ar.ged..

in the Information.
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